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1. INTRODUCTION
European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member 
states.1 For nearly forty years, it ran almost completely without the support of the Brussels-based 
institutions. The six-monthly rotating Presidency was responsible for convening meetings, issuing 
declarations  and  touring  the  world  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Union.  By  hanging  on  to  these 
functions, the member states could keep their sovereignty costs to a minimum, while benefiting at 
the same time from cooperation in the sensitive area of foreign policy. 
This practice dramatically changed with the Amsterdam Treaty and the Cologne European Council 
(1999) when the member states empowered the Council Secretariat in foreign, security and defence 
policy.2 They appointed  the  High Representative for  the  Common Foreign  and Security  Policy 
(CFSP), established a Policy Unit,  nominated EU Special  Representatives, and strengthened the 
Directorate-General for External Relations (DG E). To launch civilian and military operations, they 
equipped the Council Secretariat with two crisis management directorates, a sizeable military staff 
(EUMS), a civilian planning and operations headquarters (CPCC), and an intelligence capability 
1 EU foreign policy refers in this article exclusively to European Political Cooperation (1970-1993) and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (1993-date). It is not concerned with external relations policies in a wider sense.
2 The Council Secretariat is formally known as the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. While it  
is not a formal EU institution (article 13 TEU [ex 7 TEC]), it will be treated as such in this article.
(SITCEN). These services employed 450+ a-grade civil servants in 2009. They currently form the 
backbone of the recently established European External Action Service (EEAS).
The creation of foreign policy bureaucracies in Brussels is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable 
recent institutional developments in the EU. Small wonder that it has attracted academic attention. 
Various observers – from very different theoretical perspectives – explain why the member states 
have strengthened the Council Secretariat and have delegated new foreign policy functions (e.g. 
Christiansen 2002; Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006; Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008; Dijkstra 
2008, 2010a). A thorough analysis of the effects of these institutional developments, on the other 
hand, is still missing.3 This article tries to fill this lacuna. It analyses under which conditions civil 
servants of the Council Secretariat asserted political influence in the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) – the most institutionalized part of EU foreign policy. Influence is defined as getting 
the member states to do something they would otherwise not have done (cf. Dahl 1957).
Providing empirical evidence from four case studies, this article shows that the Council Secretariat 
asserted most influence in agenda-setting and more influence in civilian than in military operations. 
Its prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by its pivotal position in policy-making. It was at 
the heart of the enterprise and through its networks it became early involved in the planning of 
operations. This allowed it to contribute to the framing of missions and the construction of  faits  
accomplis. Its strength in civilian crisis management resulted from the absence of strong control 
mechanisms  and  doctrine.  While  the  member  states  have  three  committees  for  military  crisis 
management, they have only one (relatively junior) civilian committee. This committee dealt with a 
dozen operations compared to one/two parallel military missions. Moreover, the Council Secretariat 
directed civilian operations from Brussels, while the command of military operations was with the 
member states or NATO. Finally, the lack of doctrine made civilian crisis management difficult for 
the member states to control.
This article starts with a theoretical discussion of the Council Secretariat's interests, resources and 
opportunities and the control mechanisms of the member states. It then discusses the influence of 
the Council Secretariat during the different phases of the policy-process (agenda-setting, decision-
making  and  implementation)  of  the  military  operations  in  Bosnia  and  Chad  and  the  civilian 
missions in Aceh and Kosovo. These were highly salient missions with variation in terms of regions 
(Europe / outside Europe) and time (2004-2005 / 2007-2008). The empirical analysis is based on 
official documents and 105 semi-structured elite interviews with civil servants from the Council 
Secretariat, European Commission, member states and international organizations. These sources 
are  complemented  by  newspaper  articles  and  secondary  literature.  This  article  concludes  by 
comparing the findings of the case studies.
2. POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT
2.1 Interests and goal conflicts
Studying the political influence of the Council Secretariat is only interesting, if there is actually a 
goal conflict with the preferences of member states. In the principal-agent literature, goal conflicts 
are typically assumed. For example, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991: 5) conﬁdently state that “there 
is almost always some conﬂict between the interests of those who delegate authority (principals) 
and the agents to whom they delegate it”. It is nonetheless a good idea to identify what the Council  
3 There are notable exceptions that deal with the Council Secretariat in foreign policy after delegation. Juncos and 
Pomorska (2010) study role perceptions amongst Secretariat officials. Merand et al. (2010, 2011) show, amongst 
others, that Council Secretariat officials are part of the core CSDP policy networks. Klein (2010) conceptualizes the  
Council Secretariat in terms of the principal-agent model, but is empirically very short on agency.
Secretariat exactly wants. This also helps us to understand why it is pursuing particular strategies 
throughout the policy process. 
Two interrelated interests can be identified. The first interest of the Council Secretariat is in 'more' 
CSDP. At least since the budget-maximizing model, as proposed by William Niskanen (1968), it has 
been generally assumed that bureaucracies have an interest in expansion. This can take the form of 
an increased budget, staff, or competences as has been argued in case of the EU (e.g. Majone 1996; 
Pollack 1997). If this assumption holds for the Council Secretariat, it will have a clear interest in 
launching new operations, as this requires a higher budget and more staff (cf. 'more Europe', Ross 
1995). Put it the other way around, without CSDP missions, the various crisis management services 
in the Council Secretariat inevitably lose their raison d'être at some point.
There is further reason for the Council Secretariat to lobby for missions. Within the EU context, it 
faces institutional competition from the Commission in external relations (e.g. Dijkstra 2009; Klein 
2010). The Council Secretariat has thus an interest in expanding its territory (e.g. Downs 1967). 
One way of doing this is by giving external relations issues a security dimension with the result that 
they fall under the competence of the Council rather than under the Commission. Various observers 
have unsurprisingly witnessed a 'second pillarization' at the expense of Commission-run first pillar 
external relations (Gourlay 2004; Manners 2006; Edwards 2006). CSDP has been a useful tool for 
the second pillarization of foreign policy. By putting troops on the ground in third countries, the 
Council Secretariat has tried to gain control over foreign policy proper.
The second interest of the Council Secretariat is for CSDP to be successful. It has therefore policy-
seeking preferences (cf. Strøm 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999). These interests are not necessarily in 
conflict with its expansionist interests or with the preferences of the member states, but in various 
instances substantive preferences can be. In particular, the Council Secretariat has been extremely 
wary of failure. If missions would go wrong, it could mean the end of EU crisis management, which  
is clearly not in the longer-term interest of the Council Secretariat. CSDP mandates are therefore 
narrowly defined and end-date operations are preferred to end-state missions (Mattelaer 2010), yet 
this conflicts with expansionist interests. The Council Secretariat thus has to balance interests.
2.2 Bureaucratic resources
Following the identification of preferences, it is necessary to analyse the bureaucratic resources of 
the Council Secretariat. Given its very limited formal competences in foreign policy, these must be 
sought in its institutional position in policy-making and its superior expertise, which both allow for 
information asymmetries that favour the Council Secretariat.
The Council Secretariat is notorious for its institutional memory resulting from its administrative 
functions  (minute-taking,  organization  of  work,  archives)  and its  continuity  (e.g.  Westlake  and 
Galloway 2006; Hayes- Renshaw and Wallace 2006).  Its  institutional position in policy-making 
yields  further  advantages.  It  gives it  a  clear  overview of  the state  of  negotiations between the 
member  states  (Beach  2005),  which  is  valuable  information  as  timing  is  so  crucial  in  all 
negotiations. Due to its relatively neutral reputation, the Council Secretariat is a natural focal point, 
together with the rotating Presidency, for brokerage. This involves becoming party to privileged 
information, as brokerage generally used to create an opportunity to signal bottom lines (Tallberg 
2006). Overall, the Council Secretariat has accumulated considerable  process expertise (e.g. Wall 
and Lynn 1993; Beach 2005; Tallberg 2006), which creates a position of authority as guardian of the 
orthodoxy.
Networks are another important resource for the Council Secretariat (Haas 1992; Peterson 1995). It 
allows the Council Secretariat to gather information and to contact relevant stakeholders through 
informal channels. The Council Secretariat can therefore to go beyond formal national gatekeepers, 
such as the diplomats in the controlling committees (see below). Networks are important at different  
levels.  Due to  their  pivotal  position in  policy-making, the bureaucratic  services of the  Council 
Secretariat are part of core CSDP networks (Mérand et al. 2010, 2011). At the senior bureaucratic 
and political level, the officials of the Council Secretariat have many contacts in the member states, 
third states and other international organizations. Javier Solana as the High Representative is a case 
in point, but it goes as well for his senior civil servants.
The Council Secretariat also possesses considerable content expertise in CSDP (e.g. Wall and Lynn 
1993; Beach 2005; Tallberg 2006). In the introduction, the various bureaucratic services have been 
mentioned already. The civilian and military crisis management directorates employ approximately 
sixty civil servants, who are closely involved in the political decision-making in the Council. The 
military staff consists of nearly two hundred officers and provides the member states with planning 
documents and the liaison with the military headquarters. The CPCC of around seventy officials is 
in charge of civilian planning as well as operational command of the various civilian missions. The 
situation centre, which employs at least one hundred civil servants, provides the member states with 
security and intelligence assessments.4
These services are responsible for much of the initial information-gathering, information-processing 
and the planning of operations (Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker 2011). Most CSDP missions start with a 
briefing and/or an options paper by the Council Secretariat. The Council Secretariat is then at the 
heart of the fact-finding mission on the ground. The fact-finding mission in turn leads to the Crisis 
Management Concept, which is the first formal planning document (Mattelaer 2010). Based on this 
concept, the EUMS and the CPCC draft the Strategic Options and the formal Joint Action. While 
the military headquarters and the member states are responsible for the launch and implementation 
of the operation, the Council Secretariat continues to fulfil a liaison and reporting function between 
Brussels and the operation. In civilian operations, the Council Secretariat has operational authority 
over the conduct of the mission. Dealing on a day-to-day basis with the implementation of tasks 
leads to specialization on the side of the Council Secretariat (Hawkins et al. 2006). 
2.3 Control mechanisms
The involvement of the Council Secretariat cannot be enjoyed without certain agency losses. As 
Lake and McCubbins (2006: 343) succinctly stated “no pain, no gain”. This does, however, not 
mean that influence is excessive. Principal-agent literature expects that the member states might 
tolerate some influence by the Council Secretariat, as it might know better what policies are in the  
EU's interest. Control mechanisms are nonetheless put in place to limit its influence. They always 
involve costs due to lower efficiency and extra requirements for the member states and the Council 
Secretariat (Miller 2005).
The ultimate control mechanism is re-contracting. If political influence becomes excessive, member 
states may take back some of the functions. This puts a natural break on the Council Secretariat, 
which is fearful of such prospect. Member states also put in place institutional checks and balances 
for day-to-day policy-making. Decision-making and political-strategic oversight in CSDP rests with 
the member states. The delegation of several CSDP tasks to the Commission instead of the Council 
Secretariat is also a way of limiting influence (Klein 2010). Through administrative instructions, the 
member states can put limits on the room to manoeuvre as well (Hawkins et al. 2006; Bradley and 
Kelley 2008). Agent screening and selection is a frequently used method to ensure that bureaucratic 
leadership in the Council Secretariat has rather similar preferences as the member states (Kahler 
2001; Hawkins et al. 2006).
4 Little is known about the precise size of SITCEN. It has staff in Brussels and within the operations. Moreover, it 
also has an important internal security mandate.
Another method of control is to limit the resources of the Council Secretariat. It does not have a say 
over its own budget ceilings, the number of staff or competences. This fits in with general practice 
in international organizations, where secretariats have remained rather small (Stone 2009). There is 
also the question of the quality of staff and their loyalties. The Council Secretariat can only recruit a 
small proportion of staff autonomously. Many civil servants are member states appointees through 
secondment arrangements or otherwise. While these officials are not necessarily national agents 
behaving as Trojan horses (Trondal 2006), they undermine the institutional memory, continuity and 
thus expertise of the Council Secretariat. Few on the Council Secretariat staff, moreover, have, a 
personal desire to promote institutional interests (Juncos and Pomorska 2010).
The most important control mechanisms of the member states are the oversight committees in the 
Council. This includes the Political and Security Committee at ambassador level, but particularly its 
underlying working groups. To carry out oversight tasks, these national diplomats perform, with the 
help of ministries in the capitals, many of the same information-processing functions as the Council 
Secretariat. They can thus be conceptualized as small shadow bureaucracies, which have the aim of 
narrowing the informational asymmetry with the Council Secretariat (Lake and McCubbins 2006). 
The quality of oversight in the working groups is conditioned, in this respect, by the expertise in the 
ministries as well as the coordination in the capitals and with the permanent representations (e.g.  
Vanhoonacker and Jacobs 2010; Panke 2010).
There is a difference in the oversight of military and civilian missions. The EUMC, composed of 
two and three-star generals, is supported by two working groups. It generally deals with one/two 
operations at the same time and receives instructions directly from the national defence ministries. 
CIVCOM, in contrast, consists of junior to mid-career diplomats (Cross 2010). It has up to a dozen 
civilian missions on its agenda and is not supported by working groups. Moreover, instructions have 
to come from the ministries of interior and justice, both of which are not the parent ministry of these  
diplomats. Striking is also the lack of civilian doctrine (Benner and Bossong 2010). Doctrine and 
standard operating procedures give member states guidance while exercising control. Given their 
absence, it is difficult to check Council Secretariat proposals against external benchmarks.
2.4 Opportunities
The Council Secretariat has bureaucratic resources in CSDP and control mechanisms do not fully 
compensate in this regard. This leads to opportunities for asserting political influence (Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet 2002). The final step is therefore to identify these opportunities. They differ throughout 
the policy process.
Agenda-setting essentially relates to the ability of the Council Secretariat to get certain issues high 
on the agenda and to keep them there (Princen 2007; Tallberg 2003). While it has no formal right of 
initiative, it can point attention to its issues through informal channels (Pollack 2003; Peters 2001). 
There are several opportunities due to its position in policy-making. Princen and Rhinard (2006) 
distinguish  between  a  political  and  administrative  route  to  agenda-setting.  The  political  route 
includes top-down pressure, while the administrative route is bottom-up with the gradual building 
of  momentum.  The Council  Secretariat  has  the  ability  to  alternate  between  these  political  and 
administrative venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). It is active at the political and administrative 
level. When it gets stuck at one level, it can move to the other one and vice versa.
As the Council Secretariat is at the heart of policy-making, it gets very early involved in operations, 
which gives it a first mover advantage. Agenda-setting literature argues that this allows for conflict 
expansion and the framing of issues (Princen 2007). By getting like-minded member states involved 
and by keeping the opposing member states outside the inner club that discusses CSDP operations, 
the Council Secretariat can create momentum. By raising expectations with external parties, it can 
furthermore construct faits accomplis on which the EU eventually has to act. Framing of the CSDP 
missions in a way that they become palatable for the majority of member states is also an advantage 
of early involvement. The later one gets involved in the process, the more difficult is becomes to 
change dominant discourse.
In addition to brokerage, the Council Secretariat can affect decision-making in CSDP operations 
through  its  private  information  and  expertise.  It  is  about  the  “ability  to  manipulate  either  the 
construction of policy alternatives or information about the consequences of different alternatives” 
(Bendor,  Taylor  and Van Gaalen  1985:  1042;  Dahl  [1963]  2003).  By affecting  the  substantive 
information basis, on which member states base their decisions, the Council Secretariat can assert 
influence.  It  has  a  strong position,  if  it  possesses  exclusive  'hidden information'  (Arrow 1985) 
resulting from autonomous information-gathering. It is, however, more likely that member states 
suffer from information overload. They may not be capable to evaluate all policy options on time, 
as  a  result  of  limited  information-processing  skills  and  expertise.  Informational  asymmetries 
depending on the Council Secretariat's resources and the member states' control mechanisms are in 
this respect important, as discussed above. 
Policy implementation differs from agenda-setting and decision-making. During the implementation 
of the decisions made by the member states, the Council Secretariat can act on its own preferences 
rather than “strictly and faithfully [following] the preferences of the member states that created and 
empowered them” (Pollack 2003: 38). Its ability for 'hidden action' is important (Arrow 1985). This 
concept implies that “the agent's action is not directly observable by the principal” (ibid.: 37), but 
that it does partially affect the member states' payoffs. Hidden action thus automatically results in 
political influence for the Council Secretariat. Political influence is, however, limited through the 
control mechanisms, such as the ultimate sanction of re-contracting. 
3. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OPERATIONS
3.1 Operation Althea in Bosnia
Following the Dayton agreement in 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployed 
some 60,000 troops to Bosnia. Its mission downsized significantly over time and, in December 
2004, it handed over the military operation to the EU. At the time of writing, discussions continued 
within the EU about the termination of the operation.
While the relative contribution of the United States to the NATO operation decreased over time, and 
despite pressure from Washington for increased European ownership, the takeover was by no means 
automatic. Solana spent political capital to push for the takeover as part of setting up the military 
crisis management structures. The institutional development of CSDP was good, he argued, “but the 
proof  of  the pudding is  in  the  eating” (interview national  official  2009).  He was supported by 
France and the United Kingdom, with whom he presented papers to the Council in February 2003. 
The  United States  was,  in  principle,  not  against  the  takeover,  but  it  was  wary  of  autonomous 
military operations. During the height of transatlantic tension over Iraq in 2003, it therefore blocked 
the handover for at least one semester. Only early 2004, the planning for the operation could start.
Important about the handover was that the Bosnians (and the United States) had little faith in the 
capabilities of European troops. The dominant discourse was therefore that of continuity (interviews 
national officials 2009). The EU would have the same number of troops, mandate, capabilities and 
command and control structures as the NATO operation (FT 2003a; Council 2003). Solana, on the 
other hand, also thought that the military operation should have added value for the overall effort of 
the EU in Bosnia. It should help tackle some of the most persistent problems and signal that the EU 
was now in the lead. He thus argued for a “new and distinct mission”, as it would be in a “very  
different position from that when NATO first deployed” (Solana 2004). In concrete terms, he stated 
that the military operation should contribute to the work of the High Representative/EU Special 
Representative in Bosnia and to the fight against organized crime.
Solana lost the argument. The member states noted that these were not traditional military tasks 
(interviews  national  officials  2009).  Moreover,  the  European  Commission  made  clear  that  the 
Bosnians had to take ownership themselves; having the military do things was not a good idea. In 
more general terms, the Commission also objected to strengthening the EU Special Representative 
in Bosnia, who happened to report to Solana (interviews Commission officials 2009). At the end of 
the day, more coordination, rather than a reallocation of competences, between the actors on the 
ground was stressed. The fight against organized crime became a key supporting military task rather 
than a primary objective (Council 2004; Leakey 2006). Apart from the discussions over mandate, 
Solana and the Council  Secretariat  did  not  play a  prominent  role.  They facilitated the difficult  
negotiations between the EU and NATO on practical details, such as the delineation of the mandate, 
“over the horizon” troops, and the role of NATO's regional command in Naples.
Discussions over the mandate came back on the agenda with the appointment of the first Force 
Commander, General David Leakey. Solana instructed him to carry out a new and distinct mission 
nonetheless using the supporting tasks from the mandate (interviews Althea and national officials 
2009). Leakey indeed decided to make the fight against organized crime the “centrepiece of his 
agenda” (Bertin 2008: 68). He deployed troops to combat fuel smuggling at border crossings and to 
limit illegal logging in the timber industry (Leakey 2006). His actions met resistance from many of 
the member states, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and the European Commission. The five major 
contributing member states were “very, very unenthusiastic, if not in opposition, to their military 
being used this way” (interview Althea official 2009). The member states eventually reacted by 
reducing the number of troops in Bosnia after Leakey's departure in 2005. The troubles between the 
military operation and the Police Mission led to more coordination and a stronger role for the EU 
Special Representative.
Solana and the Council Secretariat thus played an important role in getting the handover on the EU 
agenda. While they met some opposition from the United States, they managed to keep the mission 
on the agenda and they ensured that it was eventually launched. Apart from their role in agenda-
setting, they were much less effective in pursuing their interests in the planning and implementation 
of the operation. Suggestions for innovation met conservatism and standard operating procedures 
from the member states. Solana nor Leakey was in the end successful in making the EU operation 
completely new and distinct.
3.2 Military Operation in Chad/CAR
In 2008, the EU launched a 3700-troop strong military operation in eastern Chad and the Central 
African Republic (CAR) for a period of exactly one year. The purpose of this operation was to 
provide  a  “safe  and  secure  environment”  for  internally  displaced  people,  refugees  from  the 
neighbouring Darfur region, and personnel from the United Nations (UN). After the mandate had 
ended, the UN took over the well-functioning military operation.
Shortly after the election of the French President Sarkozy in 2007, France suggested that the EU 
should become closer engaged in the Darfur conflict. This led to extensive brainstorming between 
the French government and the (predominantly French) planners in the Council Secretariat. Their 
task was to “[kill] the stupid ideas” (Mattelaer 2008: 14; such as humanitarian corridors and no-fly 
zones), which had been proposed by inter alia the French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, and 
to put forward a realistic plan. The attention became focused on eastern Chad. A military operation 
in the region had been discussed since 2006, but the Chadian government was reluctant to host UN 
peacekeepers (UN 2007a). The Council Secretariat and France therefore suggested a one-year EU-
led bridging operation,  after  which the UN could take over (interviews Council  Secretariat  and 
national  officials  2009,  2010).  The Council  Secretariat  presented  these  plans as  part  of  a  joint 
options paper with the European Commission on 13 July 2007.
The intimate involvement of the Council Secretariat was important in framing the operation. From 
the start it was clear that Germany and the United Kingdom were unenthusiastic about this French 
adventure (Mattelaer 2008; Berg 2009). Support of other member states was crucial. The Council 
Secretariat therefore stressed that this was a humanitarian operation in support of activities of the 
UN (local police training, humanitarian functions). Moreover, the EU would be an impartial actor 
with respect to local politics and the operation would only last one year. These parameters of the 
mission were attractive for a whole range of member states (interviews national officials 2009). In 
addition to framing the mission, the Council Secretariat helped France with the negotiations on the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1778, raised external expectations through a fact-finding mission 
and underestimated the common costs  of  the operation (interviews Council  Secretariat  officials 
2009, 2010).
Despite the efforts of France and the Council Secretariat to make the operation look appealing, they 
struggled to get the other member states on board. Germany and the United Kingdom refused to 
participate and objected to the common costs. Other member states were reluctant and slow to make 
contributions available during the various force generation conferences. It remained difficult for the 
member states to see how the EU could be perceived as impartial given close ties between France  
and the incumbent regime. In addition, they realized that the the investment in eastern Chad would 
serve French interests most (Mattelaer 2008). The Council Secretariat could not do much about it. 
At the end of the day, Sarkozy called his counterparts to request troop contributions (interviews 
national officials 2009). Several of the member states (notably Ireland and Poland) came on board, 
but enthusiasm remained limited.
The problems with force generation and the lengthy activation of the Operations Headquarters led 
to a delay of the operation, which could declare Initial Operational Capability on 15 March 2008. A 
shortfall in specific capabilities (i.e. helicopters) made the military operation less mobile (interview 
EUFOR official  2009).  Moreover,  the  situation  on  the  ground differed from what  the  EU had 
planned for. Instead of confrontations with armed rebels, the EU was faced with lower-level petty 
crime and human rights violations in  the refugee  camps for which it  was ill-equipped (Oxfam 
2008). The main cause was a security vacuum resulting from the absence of UN police trainers. The 
Council Secretariat in Brussels could do little about it. Problems became worse when the Security 
Council failed to agree on time on a handover. The EU eventually had to force the UN to take over, 
while  still  making 2000+ troops and capabilities  available  for  the  UN force.  This  came at  the 
expense of good relations (see Dijkstra 2010b).
As with the military operation in Bosnia, the Council Secretariat played a role in the agenda-setting 
of the mission. While it is difficult to exactly distinguish between the civil servants of France and 
the Council Secretariat, the Secretariat clearly supported France in creating momentum, framing the 
operation and pushing it through. The Council Secretariat was much weaker in the planning of the 
operation,  its  force  generation  and  the  implementation.  These  were  eventually  decided  by  the 
member states and their military. 
3.3 Aceh Monitoring Mission
The Aceh Monitoring Mission resulted directly from a peace agreement between the Government of 
Indonesia and the rebels, which had been negotiated after the tsunami had devastated the province 
of Aceh in December 2004. For 15 months, EU and ASEAN monitors oversaw the implementation 
of the peace agreement, which included the decommissioning of weapons and the withdrawal of the 
Indonesian army (2005-2006).
The peace negotiations between the parties took place in Helsinki and were mediated by the former 
Finnish President Ahtisaari. From the very start, he realized that he would not be able to oversee the 
implementation of an eventual agreement. In January 2005, he therefore contacted Solana and the 
Deputy Director-General External Relations of the Council Secretariat, Pieter Feith, whom he had 
known since  the  1970s,  about  possible  EU involvement  (Accord  2008).  They told him to  “go 
ahead” with mediation (Merikallio 2008: 80). Feith and the Council Secretariat planners discussed a 
possible monitoring mission in February and they went to Helsinki in May with worked-out plans. 
This created external expectations that the EU would get involved. These expectations increased 
when Feith went on a fact-finding mission to the region in June, which effectively created a  fait  
accompli for the member states.
The possible Aceh Monitoring Mission was not very popular with the member states. While they 
recognized the possible added value the EU would bring, only Finland, France, Sweden and The 
Netherlands were in favour (Grevi 2005). In fact,  the ambassadors in Jakarta had been sending 
critical signals about the situation on the ground (Merikallio 2008; interview Commission official 
2009). Financing the operation was also a particular problem, as the CFSP budget was insufficient. 
On 26 July, Solana intervened noting that the EU would have to undertake this mission. Meanwhile 
the Council Secretariat creatively suggested financing the operation through ad hoc contributions of 
the member states. None of the member states was particularly pleased with this solution, but they 
decided to go along with it (Grevi 2005).
It was not just about whether the EU should launch this mission, the Council Secretariat also played 
a crucial role in setting the parameters. Noteworthy is the very limited mandate – focussing solely 
on security issues and not on development and human rights – and the initial six months duration of 
the mission (Schulze 2007). This was the best means for the EU to quick declare success and to get  
out as soon as possible. Moreover, the Council Secretariat set the total authorized strength of the 
mission, which was presented as a fait accompli to the negotiating parties and the member states. Its 
civil servants furthermore exceptionally wrote all the planning documents on the ground, because of 
time pressure and the lack of planning staff at headquarters during the summer (interviews Council 
Secretariat and national officials 2009). Finally, Council Secretariat planners established an Initial 
Monitoring Presence to cover for the period between the peace agreement and the deployment of 
the EU monitors.
The Council Secretariat was also intensively involved in the implementation of the mission. Feith 
became the Head of Mission on the ground and he took many of his staff members with him from 
Brussels. While the decommissioning of weapons was a Finnish-led exercise, Feith undertook a 
number of activities to pro-actively create confidence between the parties. An important example is 
the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA). While not foreseen in the peace agreement, 
Feith used these meetings – initially twice per week – to discuss with the parties all incidents that  
had taken place and issue that might threaten the peace agreement. Many involved observers stress 
the importance of such pro-active monitoring (Kirwan 2008; Schulze 2007; interviews mission staff 
2009).
The Aceh Monitoring Mission was thus very much a Council Secretariat show. In close cooperation 
with President Ahtisaari, the mission was put on the EU agenda. Political and administrative means 
were then employed to make the mission a reality. Apart from pushing for this mission, the civil  
servants in the Council Secretariat set most of the important parameters of the mission and played a 
crucial role at the heart of the implementation of the mission.
3.4 Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
Following the war in Kosovo in 1999, the UN put in place an international civilian administration  
and postponed negotiation over status. Over time, however, call for independence increased and in 
2005 a status process was set in motion under the leadership of President Ahtisaari. Closely related 
to this process was the handover of UN responsibilities to a EU rule of law mission (EULEX). Due 
to status-related problems this handover was messy, but since 2008 some 3000 EU and local experts 
are carrying out executive and non-executive tasks in the areas of police, justice and customs.
Solana and his officials in the Council Secretariat have been closely involved in the whole process. 
Following the riots in March 2004, which triggered the status process, Solana put one of his civil  
servants, Soren Jessen-Peterson, at the head of the UN mission (interviews UN officials 2010). In 
addition,  his  Western  Balkans  Director,  Stephan  Lehne,  became  closely  involved  in  the  status 
negotiations under Ahtisaari. In the spring of 2005, Solana co-authored a paper with Enlargement 
Commissioner Olli Rehn on the future EU involvement in Kosovo (Solana and Rehn 2005a). One 
of the major points was that the EU would play a major role in Kosovo by taking over functions 
from the UN. However, the report noted that a EU presence could not be a simple continuation of  
the UN administration, as the reputation of the UN had been badly damaged by the March 2004 
riots. The EU would instead focus on the rule of law.
Over time it  became conventional wisdom that the EU would take over (interview UN official 
2010). At the end of 2005, Solana and Rehn wrote a second report (Solana and Rehn 2005b), which 
suggested a fact-finding mission. This fact-finding mission, which took place in February 2006, in 
turn, stated that any EU presence had to be carefully planned. A permanent planning team on the 
ground was therefore required. It was established in May and it sent its first option paper to the 
member states in September 2006 (Grevi 2009). In line with the discourse of Solana, the planning 
team suggested a light presence of less than 1000 international staff members. This light option 
became  unattainable  when  it  became increasingly  clear  that  there  would  not  be  an  agreement 
between the government of Serbia and the authorities of Kosovo on status (interview planning team 
and UN officials 2010).
The disagreements on status also had an impact in Brussels, where the member states were divided.  
Because it was difficult for the EU to plan on the basis of disagreement, the Council Secretariat  
planned the mission on the assumption that there would be a final agreement on states (interviews 
Council Secretariat, national officials 2010). This allowed the planning to go ahead. However, since 
the Kosovo dossier was contentious for the member states, they preferred not to talk about it too 
often, particularly not at ambassador level. Since CIVCOM was, however, at a too low level to take  
real decisions, the process went in circles. Eventually Council Secretariat officials had to take many 
decisions themselves (interview Council Secretariat and national officials 2010). The situation was 
worsened by the fact that because EULEX was such ambitious mission, the chain of command for 
civilian mission completely had to be changed. Solana already foresaw this at the Hampton Court 
European Council in October 2005, but it was difficult for CIVCOM to agree on such structures.
In March 2007, Ahtisaari unveiled his plan for “supervised independence”, which was endorsed by 
the Kosovo authorities but rejected by Serbia. This created a stalemate in the UN and led to the 
eventual unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. Because the UN Security Council 
could  not  agree,  there  was  no  new resolution.  This  made  it  difficult  for  the  UN to  handover 
functions (and equipment) to the EU. The United States and leading member states put tremendous 
political pressure on the UN; and Council Secretariat officials worked out technical details with UN 
counterparts. The pro-active approach of the Council Secretariat was important in the launching of 
the operation.
After Serbia finally agreed that the UN would hand over parts of its responsibilities to the EU, the 
mission was launched in December 2008. EULEX reached full operating capability by April 2009. 
While a new command and control structure was established in Brussels for this mission, in practice 
it has been difficult for the member states to keep full control over implementation. The sheer size 
of the operation leads to information overload and CIVCOM delegates have more on their agenda 
than Kosovo. One national interviewee noted “[the people in the Council Secretariat] are the real 
experts … I am dealing with nine missions, so it is … difficult to have an in-depth picture” (2010). 
That having said, the room for the Council Secretariat and the mission to manoeuvre is conditioned 
by the tremendous political difficulties on status. The mission has been pro-active with arranging 
practical matters, but in implementation it come, time and again, across political issues.
Solana and the Council Secretariat thus played an important role with regard to EULEX. They were 
very early involved and had contacts in all the important parts of the process. Together with Rehn,  
Solana set some of the important parameters of the operation, although the changing international 
environment required some adjustments to the initial plans. Assuming eventual settlement, however, 
the Council Secretariat planned the mission and it became conventional wisdom that the EU would 
take over. The Council Secretariat had to take a leadership role, because the member states in the 
committees did not want to discuss Kosovo too often and because they lacked the expertise to get 
this operation of the ground. In the launching and early conduct of the operation, officials from the 
Council Secretariat took a pro-active approach.
4. CONCLUSION
The political influence of the EU institutions has historically triggered much scholarly debate. For a 
long time, the emphasis was on the internal market and the regulatory policies. Foreign policy as the 
exemplification of high politics was generally considered a member states' affair (Hoffmann 1966). 
With the strengthening of the Council Secretariat and the delegation of foreign policy functions as 
part of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Cologne European Council, this is no longer obvious. The 
Council Secretariat is generally considered an important actor in Brussels. This article has analyzed 
under which conditions it asserted political influence in CSDP.
The empirical evidence suggests that it played a significant role in the agenda-setting of the CSDP 
missions and that it has more influence in civilian than in military operations. Its prominence in 
agenda-setting can be explained by its pivotal position in policy-making and its resulting very early 
involvement in planning. In the case of Bosnia, Javier Solana pushed for the takeover from NATO. 
In Chad, the Council Secretariat teamed up with France. In Aceh, the Council Secretariat had strong 
contacts with Ahtisaari and the negotiations in Finland. As for Kosovo, the Council Secretariat was 
omnipresent from the beginning and acted with considerable foresight. While in all the cases, the 
Council Secretariat thus played an important role, it is noteworthy that in military operations it was 
in close cooperation with key member states, while in civilian missions, the Council Secretariat was 
stronger an actor in its own right during the phase of agenda-setting.
Such variation between military and civilian missions was very present in the decision-making and 
implementation of CSDP. The efforts of Solana, for example, to make the military operation in 
Bosnia new and distinct were blocked by the member states during the planning and conduct of the 
mission. In Chad, the Council Secretariat faced tremendous opposition of some member states and a 
lack of military contributions. The mission was eventually launched mainly due to French lobbying. 
The implementation of the operation took place outside the Council Secretariat's remit. In civilian 
crisis management, it was quite a different story. The Council Secretariat had a tremendous impact 
on getting the Aceh Monitoring Mission approved, setting the mandate, and on implementation. In 
the case of Kosovo, the Council Secretariat pushed for a limited mandate different from that of the 
UN mission and it took a pro-active role in the launch and implementation. For the member states,  
it was difficult to exercise appropriate control due to the problems surrounding status and the lack 
of sufficient civilian expertise at committee level.
At the time of writing, the External Action Service (EEAS) was established. The remaining question  
is therefore whether this development will increase the political influence of Brussels in CSDP. It is 
needless to say to early to answer, but some speculations are in place. The EEAS takes over all the 
crisis management services from the Council Secretariat, but these services are not significantly 
strengthened. In planning and conducting CSDP operations, the EEAS might however benefit from 
its increased foreign policy expertise as well as autonomous information-gathering. Coordination 
might become easier as some of the turf tensions between the Commission and Council Secretariat 
have disappeared. On the other hand, the fact that the EEAS not has to compete with the other EU 
institutions might make it less interested in pushing for CSDP operations. Lady Ashton seems, in 
this respect, to take a different approach than Javier Solana, for whom CSDP was the cornerstone of 
EU foreign policy. The influence of the EEAS thus remains a topic for further research.
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